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Are octroyed Constitutions of the 19th century to be considered as imposed 
Constitutions? 
Jörg Gerkrath* 
The following contribution contemplates so-called ‘octroyed’, ‘conceded’ or ‘granted’ 
constitutions of 19th century Europe whose common roots are to be found in the 
French Charte constitutionnelle of 1814. Strongly influenced by the spirit of 
Restoration and based on the monarchical principle, as reaffirmed by the Congress 
of Vienna (1814–1815) and the founding act of the German Confederation (1820)1, 
these Charters stem from a paternalistic process of domestic constitution-making 
without any direct involvement of (a body representing) the people.  
The terminology employed in legal literature to examine the phenomenon is not 
entirely fixed. Although English speaking scholars refer predominantly to ‘conceded’ 
or ‘granted’ constitutions, it appears to be more adequate to speak of ‘octroyed’ 
constitutions. The term ‘octroyed’ is commonly used in its different linguistic 
expressions in those countries which experienced significant periods of octroyed 
constitutions: in German, oktroyierte Verfassung, in French, constitution octroyée, in 
Italian, costituzione ottriata and, in Portuguese, constituição outorgada. 
The French Charter of 1814, the archetype of all octroyed constitutions, contains the 
following royal statement at the very end of its preamble: ‘Nous avons volontairement 
et par le libre exercice de notre autorité royale accordé, et accordons, fait concession 
et octroi à nos sujets, tant pour nous que pour nos successeurs et à toujours, de la 
charte constitutionnelle qui suit’.2 Clearly the three terms are used together in that 
occasion. Hence, from a linguistic, as well as from a legal-historical perspective, the 
adjectives ‘granted’ and ‘conceded’ might be used as synonyms of 'octroyed'. But as 
we are dealing here with a matter of constitutional law and theory where language 
matters and as we are striving to develop convincing elements of a theory of octroi in 
constitution making, this contribution will therefore promote the corresponding 
vocabulary, even though the above quoted final sentence of the preamble of the 
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1 Final Act of the Ministerial Conference to Complete and Consolidate the Organization of the German 
Confederation, signed by the parties May 15, 1820. 
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and forever, the constitutional charter that follows’.  
 2	
French Charter of 1814 contains the only explicit mention of the term octroi in a 
constitutional document of the considered period. Regarding all the other 
constitutional documents, the designation ‘octroyed’ was introduced later by 
literature.  
The paper intends to fill a gap in legal literature. Besides a stimulating contribution of 
Luigi Lacchè, Professor in Legal History at the University of Macerata, on the very 
theory of octroi,3 and a synthetic Encyclopedia entry authored by Yasuo Hasebe,4 the 
lack of comprehensive comparative literature on the technique of constitutional octroi 
is obvious.5 All other relevant works (known by the author) are based on the study of 
one single charter or an analysis of constitutions from a single country.6 
This study does not pretend to constitute a fully-fledged comparative work. It is more 
of an essay aiming at defining criteria allowing us a) to better understand the concept 
of an octroyed constitution, and b) to find out whether an octroyed constitution is 
equivalent to an imposed one. Nevertheless, the inquiry faces some of the same 
challenges and has to comply with the methodology of Comparative Law, as far as 
possible.7 In the first place the tertium comparationis, that is the common quality of 
the charters and constitutions to be compared, needs to be properly defined. 
An octroyed constitution can be described as: resulting from an authoritarian or 
paternalistic process of constitution-making engaged unilaterally by a monarch 
possessing the de facto constituent power and exercising it without the direct 
involvement of a body representing the people. By this act, the formerly absolute 
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sovereign renounces - in theory spontaneously and irrevocably - to a part of his own 
exclusive authority.8 In reality, such acts of constitutional voluntarism were intended 
to conceal the need to compromise with social reality.9 
Jon Elster distinguishes two forms of constitution-making by a single founder: „In 
one, a wise man writes a constitution for his community and then withdraws from 
politics. Plutarch tells us that Solon and Lycurgus (if he existed) took this path. It has 
never been followed again’. One could, however, object that the Brazilian Emperor 
and King of Portugal, Don Pedro IV, precisely followed this example when he 
octroyed the Portuguese Carta constitucional in 1926 and abdicated from the 
Portuguese throne a few days later.10 In the other case, Elster pursues, ‘a ruler, 
presumably assisted by advisors, imposes an ‘octroyed’ constitution on his people. 
The French Charter of 1814 and Prussian constitution of 1850 are often cited as 
examples’.11  
As an ‘octroyed constitution’ is evidently enacted top-down by a monarch, there is 
some confusion to be found in legal literature regarding the concept of an ‘imposed 
constitution’ and the ‘technique of constitutional octroi’. In their contribution to the 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, devoted to ‘Process’ and within 
their developments about ‘constitution-making as an international effort’, Claude 
Klein and András Sajó consider for instance that ‘the involvement (of the occupying 
power) may reach the level of imposition (constitutional octroy)’ and refer in a 
footnote to ‘various forms of colonization’.12 
Yasuo Hasebe applies the same inaccuracy considering: ‘Inherent in this concept of 
imposed constitution is the assumption that constituent power belongs to the people. 
Therefore, a constitution which the monarch concedes to his subjects (constitution 
octroyée) is also a kind of imposed constitution’.13 His affirmation contains a striking 
anachronism as, at the time when constitutions could legitimately be octroyed by a 
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monarch holding the plenitudo potestatis, the democratic principle had not yet 
successfully superseded the monarchical principle. 
A similar misunderstanding can be found regarding Cyprus. As well known, the 
Constitution of Cyprus did not emanate from the free will of its people but was in fact 
imposed on the population by the London and Zürich Agreements of 1959, concluded 
between representatives of the two Cypriot communities of the one part, and Greece, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom of the other part. Considering, as Tornaritis does: „It 
is, therefore (...) of the nature of a granted Constitution – constitution octroyée, which 
in the monarchical times of the past centuries the monarch condescended to grant to 
his people, but is not consistent with the new prevailing democratic principles under 
which the constituent power vests in, and is exercised by, the people’, isn’t helping to 
understand the true nature of the Constitution of Cyprus.14  
At first glance, it does not seem accurate to use the same terminology for such 
different realities as constitutional charters granted by monarchs of the early 19th 
century and a Constitution imposed by means of an international agreement in 1959. 
But could it be as simple as to distinguish 'domestically octroyed' constitutions on the 
one side and 'internationally imposed' constitutions of the other side? Or, in other 
words, would the main question be whether external or internal patrons put a given 
constitution in place? In this event, however, how should we deal with constitutional 
charters octroyed by a monarch ruling on two countries which are linked through his 
person in a so-called personal or real union? This was precisely the case in Poland 
(1815), Portugal (1826) and Luxembourg (1841). 
It goes without saying that in my opinion octroyed constitutions can never be seen as 
‘democratically established constitutions'. One could consider them as a subdivision 
of ‘imposed constitutions’, even though they show a number of specific 
characteristics which distinguish them clearly from imposed constitutions in the usual 
sense. The expression ‘constitutional octroi’ should not be used as a synonym for 
any process leading to an ‘imposed Constitution’. This paper aims to develop and to 
validate or invalidate the value of a series of distinctive criteria and possible elements 
of a definition of ‘octroyed’ constitutions in order to underline their specificity. 
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In order to avoid any kind of anachronism, the different charters need to be 
understood within their historical as well as their political context.15 Before starting to 
discuss the criteria that I consider to be distinctive of octroyed constitutions, it seems 
indicated to give some preliminary consideration to the dissemination of the 
phenomenon and to define the scope of this study. 
I. Dissemination of the phenomenon and scope of the study 
The constitutions of a given country certainly are ‘the product of historical 
circumstances and the reflection of certain political, economic, social and cultural 
elements’.16 In order to compare the comparable, this contribution will only consider 
octroyed constitutions enacted in 19th century Europe.  
The golden age of octroyed constitutions is the first half of the 19th century and more 
precisely the period from 1814 to 1850. This period can be identified as an own 
‘cycle’ of constitution making. We can call it the ‘restoration cycle’.17 Each of the 
octroyed constitutions is indeed a historical product linked to the specific transitional 
period called Restoration or the restorative period. They stand as necessary first or 
intermediate acts of constitutionalism and transitional steps towards the emergence 
of parliamentarism and the final victory of the idea of the people as only legitimate 
constituent power. German authors generally refer to the constitutions of this period 
as inspired by the principle of dualism (Dualismus). In the German constitutional 
monarchies of the early 19th century it was indeed possible to observe what Carl 
Schmitt called a ‘dualistic intermediate status’ (dualistischer Zwischenzustand).18  
Nevertheless, not all constitutional documents adopted during this period have been 
octroyed unilaterally by a monarch. Amongst the main exceptions to be mentioned is 
the Dutch Grondwet from 1814. Adopted by an Assembly of six-hundred notables 
convened in Amsterdam in March 1814, its preamble nevertheless opened with the 
words: ‘We, William, by the grace of God’. Despite not technically being a charte 
octroyée, the Fundamental Law was indeed ‘a typical product of Restoration 
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16 cf Miranda (n 10) 9, considering the caracteristics of portuguese constitutionalism. 
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constitutionalism’.19 So is the Dutch Grondwet of August 24, 1815 which results from 
a revision of the Grondwet 1814 and is still in place. The Norvegian Grunnloven of 
May 17, 1814 likewise was elaborated within a Constitutional Imperial Assembly.20 
Furthermore, several member states of the German Confederation adopted 
constitutions in the 1830’s in the form of constitutional pacts. The Kingdom of 
Württemberg reached this stage pre-eminently in 1819.  
Finally, a specific case to be mentioned is the Estatuto de Bayona of July 6, 1808, 
the first written Spanish constitution, even though it had no practical significance 
because it never entered into force. The Estatuto was an octroyed constitution by 
which Napoleon wanted to impose an autocratic system on Spain. In the preamble 
the constitution is presented as a pact between the king and his people. In reality, it 
was more like a constitutional octroi by Napoleon who previously had presented a 
draft to an assembly of Spanish notables, and only 75 (91 at the final session) out of 
175 appeared when asked to do so.21 
During the considered period of Restoration more or less influential constitutional 
documents have been octroyed in about a dozen European countries. Some of them 
broke records in terms of longevity, others had a rather ephemeral lifespan. When on 
the 4th of June 1814 Louis XVIII granted the French ‘Charte constitutionnelle’, often 
referred to by scholars as the prototype of an octroyed Constitution, he incidentally 
launched at the same time the restoration cycle. The Charte became for numerous 
years one of the most influential constitutional documents in continental Europe. 
It inspired notably the ‘Charte constitutionnelle du Royaume de Pologne’, the 
constitution granted by Tsar Alexander I in his role as King of Poland on November 
27, 1815, executing an obligation laid down in article I of the Final Act of the 
Congress of Vienna. The Charter was proclaimed by the Tsar both in its original 
French and a translated Polish version. 22  Transfer and reception of the French 
Charte model could also be observed in the southern German states during the 
                                                
19 Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, ‘L’histoire constitutionnelle comparée’ (1936) Annales de l'Institut de 
Droit comparé de l'Université de Paris II 86, 93. 
20 cf Ulrike Müßig, ‘Juridification by Constitution. National Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century Europe’ in Ulrike Müßig (ed) Reconsidering Constitutional Formation I, National Sovereignty, 
A comparative Analysis of the Juridification by Constitution (Springer Open 2016) 56. 
21 cf Müßig (n 20) 36 : ‘This constitutional octroi of July 6, 1808 based on monarchical prerogatives of 
the intruder king (rey intruso) was widely rejected by the people as a sign of French foreign rule.’ 
22 cf Markus J. Prutsch, Making Sense of Constitutional Monarchism in Post-Napoleonic France and 
Germany (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 61. 
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period termed early constitutionalism (Frühkonstitutionalismus).23 The constitutions 
(Verfassungsurkunden) of Nassau (September 2, 1814), Württemberg 
(Landständische Verfassung of March 15, 1815), Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach (May 5, 
1816), Bayern (May 26, 1818) and Baden (August 22, 1818) have indeed all been 
octroyed by reigning monarchs who wanted to secure their authority by granting 
rights and freedoms to their subjects and sharing the legislative power with an 
elected Parliament. 
Portugal experienced actually the longest period of octroyed constitutionalism 
(constitucionalismo outorgado) during the 19th century.24 The Carta Constitucional da 
Monarquia granted by Emperor Don Pedro IV from Brazil on April 29, 1826, remained 
in place, beside two interludes, for seventy-two years between 1826 and 1910.25 
Influenced by the French Charter and the thinking of Benjamin Constant, it also 
contained many aspects copied from the Brazilian Constitution of 1824. In Spain, on 
the contrary, the Estatuto real of 1834 only had an ephemeral existence. The Royal 
Statute was put into effect on April 10, 1834 by the Regent Maria Christina in the 
name of her daughter Isabella II in absence of any democratic consent. After a short 
and troubled period, Regina Maria Christina, re-established the constitution of Cádiz 
on August 13, 1836. 
Luxembourg’s constitutional history displays two cases of octroi. The first occurred in 
1841, when William II, King of the Netherlands and Grand-Duke of Luxembourg, in 
order to comply with the provisions of the German Confederation, of which the Grand 
Duchy was a member, granted the Constitution d’Etats pour le Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg.26 The second happened in 1856 when William III, who succeeded his 
father in 1849 and proved to be a militant defender of the royal prerogatives, staged 
a coup d’état and octroyed a constitutional revision.27 He dissolved the Chamber on 
his own authority and promulgated a revised text of the liberal Constitution of 1848. 
                                                
23 cf Jacky Hummel, ‘La Charte française de 1814 et le deutscher Konstitutionalismus : les inflexions 
d’une réception durable’ (2014) 13 Jus Politicum 1. 
24 Expression borrowed from José Miguel Sardica, ‘A Carta Constitucional portuguesa de 1826’ (2012) 
13 Historia Constitucional 527, 530. 
25 cf Gomes Canotilho (n 17) 147. 
26 The royal grand-ducal ordinance of October 12, 1841, establishing the Constitution of Estates 
(landständische Verfassung) , was published in German and French in the Legislative and 
Administrative Memorial no 51 1841 425. 
27 cf Raymond Fuselier, Les Monarches parlementaires (Les éditions ouvrières 1960) 558 who 
mentions the ‘revision octroyée’. 
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The new Constitution restored monarchy and abolished the parliamentary system. 
Though clearly adopted in breach of the formal requirements of revision of the 1848 
constitution, it was published by a royal ordinance of November 27, 1856, ‘carrying 
revision of the Constitution’.28 
Similar to the southern German states, the Italian monarchies of the 19th century also 
came across the technique of constitutional octroi. The most significant document 
was the so-called Statuto Albertino, officially named Statuto del regno di Sardegna, 
granted to the kingdom of Sardinia by King Carlo Alberto on March 4, 1848. The 
Statuto is not an oeuvre of a parliamentary assembly. Its octroi rather points to strong 
parallels with the French Charter in 1814 and the constitutions of Bavaria and Baden 
in 1818. Their common aim was to protect royal authority by an ‘eternal and 
irrevocable fundamental law of the monarchy’.29  
The Albertine Statute was also consistent with other Italian constitutions of 1848, 
which drew inspiration from the French Charter. Such were the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (February 10, 1848) and the Statute of the Grand Duchy 
of Tuscany February 15, 1848). Being written in order to subdue popular uprisings, 
they were brief and laconic and left a lot to constitutional practice. But these charters 
had a very brief lifespan and were unable to translate their goals into practice.30 In 
contrast to the Statuto Albertino which later became the constitution of the unified 
Kingdom of Italy and remained in force, with changes, until 1948. 
At the end of the Restoration cycle of constitution-making by octroi, we finally 
encounter the experiences of Prussia and Austria. The Constitution of Prussia 
(Verfassungsurkunde für den preußischen Staat) was octroyed by Friedrich Wilhelm, 
King of Prussia by the grace of God, on December 5, 1848, after having dissolved a 
constitutional convention previously convened. It was definitively confirmed by the 
King on January 31, 1850, once revised and accepted by both chambers according 
to the reservation stated in the preamble of 1848 and according to the amendment 
procedure laid down in article 112. Thus, this specimen of an oktroyierte Verfassung 
                                                
28 cf Paul Eyschen, Das Staatsrecht des Grossherzogtums (Paul Siebeck 1890) 10, Pierre Majerus, 
L’Etat luxembourgeois (Saint.Paul 1990) 26, and Luc Hommel, Les étapes constitutionnelles du 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (L’édition universelle 1935) 11. 
29 As states the final line oft the Statuto’s preambel: ‘(...) abbiamo ordinato ed ordiniamo in forza di 
Statuto e Legge fondamentale, perpetua ed irrevocabile della Monarchia, quanto segue: (...)’. 
30 Müßig (n 20) 175. 
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was in fact octroyed, revised, accepted by Parliament and finally proclaimed by the 
King in an unprecedented four step procedure.  
Concerning Austria, the Empire constitution of March 4, 1849, the so-called 
‘oktroyierte Märzverfassung’, is similarly a result of a sequence of four imperial 
patents proclaimed by Ferdinand I. It is also known as ‘Count Stadion constitution’, 
Count Franz Stadion being the Interior Minister who drafted it, while the constitutional 
committee of the Parliament was preparing a rival draft constitution.31  
The phenomenon of constitutional octroi did not fully disappear with the end of the 
Restoration period. There are still some examples of 20th century octroyed 
constitutions to be discovered in the Eastern part of the European continent as for 
instance: The Serbian Constitution of 1901, granted by Alexander I of Serbia; the 
Russian Fundamental Laws of 1906, conceded by Tsar Nicholas II; the constitution 
of Lithuania of May 15, 192832; and the Constitution of Yugoslavia of September 3, 
1931, proclaimed by Alexander I. But even in the heart of western Europe the 
Principality of Monaco received a first ‘Acte constitutionnel’ by octroy in 1911. The 
more recent Monegasque Constitution of December 17, 1962 - even though 
prepared consensually - is still considered being a charte octroyée, according to an 
opinion of the Venice Commission.33  
As we have seen, octroyed constitutions were adopted primarily in continental 
Europe. However, the phenomenon has never been limited to the ‘triangle consisting 
primarily, but not exclusively, of France from 1814 until 1830; secondly of the 
German lands from the Congress of Vienna ; and thirdly, of the Italian states, in 
particular the Kingdom of Sardinia’, as suggested by Luigi Lacchè.34 Geographically 
speaking, it could also be observed outside of Europe. A first example is the Ottoman 
Basic Law (Ḳānūn-ı Esāsī), promulgated by Sultan Abdülhamit II on December 23, 
1876. The Constitution was prepared by a commission directly assigned by the 
                                                
31 cf on this interesting period Eric Voegelin, Ruth Hein (tr), Gilbert Weiss (ed), The Authoritarian 
State: An Essay on the Problem of the Austrian State. Collected Works of Eric Voegelin vol 4 
(University of Missouri Press 1999) 130. 
32 This dictatorial constitution had been octroyed by the President of the Republic, Anton Smetona. It 
was repealed in 1938 and remained widely unapplied. cf Wolfgang Ismayr, Die politischen Systeme 
Osteuropas (2nd ed, Leske+Budrich 2013) 156. 
33 Commission européenne pour la démocratie par le droit, CDL-AD(2013)018, avis no. 695/2012 sur 
l’équilibre des pouvoirs dans la constitution et la legislation de la Principauté de Monaco, Strasbourg 
18 June 2013, 9. 
34 Lacchè (n 3) 286. 
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Sultan and published in Turkish with an official translation in French. 35  As an 
unilateral declaration of the Sultan, it is to be considered as an octroyed 
constitution.36 A second example is the well-known Japanese Meiji constitution of 
February 11, 1889; and a third one is the ‘Fundamental State Laws of the Russian 
Empire’ of April 23, 1906, granted by Tsar Nicholas II and preceded by the ‘October 
Manifesto’ of October 17, 1905 forming „a typical act of octroyed constitutionalism’.37 
I have only taken into account the octroyed constitutions adopted in European 
monarchies between1814 and 1850. In order to illustrate their distinctive patterns, I 
will mainly refer to the following six historical exemplars: France 1814, Portugal 1826, 
Luxembourg 1841, Italy 1848, Austria 1849 and Prussia 1848/1850. Although there 
are of course many differences to be observed, these constitutions have sufficient 
elements in common to illustrate what makes the category of octroyed constitutions 
(the tertium comparationis) unique. I will elaborate on five elements or criteria, which 
are all classical criteria in constitutional thought, and which I consider decisive for the 
understanding of octroyed constitutions: Process (II.), Form (III.), Legitimacy (IV.), 
Substance (V.) and Amendment (VI.).  
II. Process: the technique of octroi, a constitutional bluff? 
An octroi is a monarchical proceeding to establish a constitution (oktroyierte 
Verfassung). It is classically opposed to a second proceeding, which is the pact 
concluded between the monarch and the people, represented by Parliament 
(paktierte Verfassung). Octroyed constitutions are, in theory, voluntary concessions 
of absolute rulers. In practice, however, it was simply and only under the pressure of 
events that monarchs abandoned a fraction of their sovereignty.38 Accordingly, there 
are some prejudices to get rid of. As we will see, the constitutional octroi never 
resulted from the monarch’s free will alone, mostly it wasn’t even a true unilateral act, 
                                                
35 Abdolonyme Ubicini, La Constitution ottomane du 7 zilhidjé 1293 (23 décembre 1876). Expliquée et 
annotée (Cotillon 1877). 
36 Ergun Özbudun, ‘The Ottoman Constitution of 1876’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, (2016) <http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e639> 
accessed on 10 September 2017; Aslı Topukcu, ‘The processes and the principles of constitutional 
design in Turkey. Historical and legal perspective’, Paper presented to the World Congress of 
Constitutional Law, Oslo 2014, <https://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-and-
events/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws11/w11-topukcu.pdf> accessed on 10 
September 2017. 
37 cf Andrei Medushevsky, Russian Constitutionalism: Historical and Contemporary Development 
(Routledge 2006) 124. 
38 cf Joseph Barthélemy, Précis de droit constitutionnel (4th edn, Dalloz 1938) 110. 
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nor a product of the monarch’s sole authorship and it has often to be considered 
within a sequence of several royal acts. Altogether this points to the direction that the 
performance of octroying a constitutional charter has to be seen as what it really is: a 
royal ruse and a constitutional bluff. 
Rather than an acting of their free will, monarchs deciding to proceed to a 
constitutional octroi did regularly belief to fulfil a moral obligation towards their 
subjects or even to execute a legal obligation laid down in a superior document. The 
historical circumstances created by the Parisian peace treaties of 1814 and 1815, the 
course of the Vienna Congress and the establishment of the German Confederation 
strongly promoted this development.  
In France, Louis XVIII was pushed by his counsellors to ‘concede rather than receive’ 
a constitution. And at the same time, the allied powers had made clear during the 
conclusion of the first peace treaty of Paris on May 30, 1814, that they wouldn’t leave 
the French territory unless a government was established on constitutional 
foundations.39 The preamble of the second peace treaty of Paris, concluded after 
Napoleon’s return and the so-called ‘100 days’ on November 22, 1815, refers 
consequently to the octroyed charter of 1814.40 
The Congress of Vienna had also a noteworthy influence. According to article I of the 
Final Act of June 8, 1815, Tsar Alexander I of Russia was obliged to give a 
constitution to the newly recreated Poland, the so-called ‘Congress-Poland’. In 
addition, article XIII of the founding Act of the German Confederation (Deutsche 
Bundesakte), adopted during the Congress of Vienna, founded a duty to establish a 
‘constitution of Estates’ in all of the member states, but without prejudicing the 
procedure to follow.41 Article XIII of the Federal Act was largely responsible for the 
German early constitutionalism, especially in the southern German states. Some of 
the member states’ constitutions referred explicitly to this duty. The preamble of 
Luxembourg’s constitution of Estates of 1841 did so, and the octroyed revision of 
1856 was also explicitly motivated by the obligation of the king-grand duke to comply 
                                                
39 cf Hummel (n 23) 6. 
40 ‘Participating at present with his Most Christian Majesty in the desire to consolidate, by maintaining 
inviolate the Royal Authority, and by restoring the operation of the Constitutional Charter, the order of 
things which had been happily re-established in France, as also in the object of restoring between 
France and her Neighbours those relations of reciprocal confidence and goodwill which the fatal 
effects of the Revolution and of the system of conquest had for so long a time disturbed (…)’. 
41 Article XIII : ‘In allen Bundesstaaten wird eine landständische Verfassung stattfinden.’ 
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with the federal duty to respect the principles of the German Confederation. The 
octroyed constitution of Württemberg of 1815 also contains the expression.42 Beyond 
this legal duty, most certainly other underlying motivations of an octroi prevailed: the 
unification of territorial gains, the consolidation of finances and the demonstration of 
the new state’s sovereignty.43 
Regarding the unilateral nature of an octroi, things aren’t by far as clear as they 
seem. German scholars started in the 19th century to oppose constitutional octrois 
and constitutional pacts as two different models, the former uni-, the latter bilateral. 
But still, an octroi can be understood as the fulfillment of a promise by a monarch, 
who sacrifices some of his powers in establishing a constitutionally limited monarchy 
and in doing so makes a gift to his subjects who accept it. In this sense the octroi 
results from a kind of dialogue, which is different than a joint and bilateral 
constitution-making procedure involving a ruler and an assembly. But it isn’t truly 
unilateral either. 
The octroi appears as a kind of transactional measure, even though the degree of 
popular consent varies naturally. The strongest case was to be found in Prussia in 
1848/1850 where the octroyed constitution required a revision to be voted by the two 
chambers in order to become effective. But also in Austria the imperial patent 
(constitutional act) that introduced the Pillersdorff Constitution on April 25, 1848 
‘appears as the fulfilment of a fundamental obligation toward the contractual partner, 
the people’.44 In one case, as in Bohemia in October 1871, a nation of the Austrian 
Empire considered an octroi by the shared dynast to be a satisfaction of their own 
demands rather than a unilateral absolute action. Such a ‘requested octroi’ was 
‘understood as something to be granted or bestowed, not as something to be 
imposed’.45  In this understanding the people relied on a virtual (moral) compact 
between the monarch and itself.  
Taking a closer look at the drafting procedure of the constitution, which usually 
precedes its formal octroi, a distinction between the author (auteur) and the writer 
                                                
42 cf Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789. Band I: Reform und 
Restauration 1789 bis 1830 (2nd edn, W. Kohlhammer 1967) 640. 
43 cf Hummel (n 23) 5-6; Ulrike Müßig, Die europäische Verfassungsdiskussion des 18. Jahrhundert 
(Mohr Siebeck 2008) 91. 
44 Voegelin (n 31) 131. 
45 ibid 
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(écrivain) of the constitution is suggested in literature. Some go as far as to consider 
the king being only the writer, writing down what the true author, the nation, 
accepted.46 In any case, the monarch assisted by advisors, counsellors and drafting 
committees, is always more or less actively involved in the editing of the text. In 
some cases, like in Bavaria, he would nominate a constitutional committee charged 
to prepare a draft.47 In others, like in Prussia, a reluctant Monarch who wanted to 
keep his promise of a constitution to be agreed upon with an elected Parliament, had 
to be convinced by his ministry to proceed by octroi.48 The drafting of the Portuguese 
Charter in 1826 constitutes another interesting example. Don Pedro IV, emperor of 
Brazil, assisted by his counselor, Francisco Gomes da Silva, prepared this text in a 
few days by working on a draft of the Brasilian Constitution from 1823. Each of the 
two worked on a paper copy, which was revised and annotated and then switched 
between them.49 
Frequently the octroi wasn’t an isolated act but resulted from a sequence of acts 
adopted in a step-by-step process as the constitution was announced by preceding 
declarations or statements, for instance. The Declaration of Saint-Ouen, made by the 
future Louis XVIII on May 2, 1814, may illustrate this. Upon landing in France, the 
future king rejected the provisional constitution proposed by the Senate but promised 
to adopt a new ‘liberal constitution’. This promised constitution was eventually 
adopted in the Charter of 1814. He later sought to eradicate the legal effects of the 
initial compromise in a third step by establishing the offence of criticising the octroi by 
a statute of March 22, 1822.50 The Austrian Empire faced a similar sequence of 
several constitutional patents between April 1848 and March 1849. A first patent of 
March 15, 1848 promised a constitutional charter, which was octroyed on April 25, 
1848, the so-called Pillersdorffsche Verfassung. It was declared provisional in May 
16, 1848, withdrawn in July by the Emperor and replaced by the ‘oktroyierte 
Märzverfassung’ of March 4, 1849, which itself was repealed by the New Year's Eve 
Patent (Silvesterpatent) of Emperor Franz Joseph I on December 31, 1851. 
                                                
46 cf Ferreira (n 5) 115. 
47 On the constitutional committee nominated in the Kingdom of Bavaria by a royal edict of September 
17, 1814, see Hummel (n 23) 6; Eberhard Weis, ‚Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der bayerischen 
Verfassung von 1818. Die Debatten in der Verfassungskommission von 1814/15’ (1976) 39 ZBLG 
414. 
48 cf Michael Kotulla, Das konstitutionelle Verfassungswerk Preußens 1848–1918 (Springer 2012) 13. 
49 On the drafting process cf Miranda (n 10) 39. 
50 cf Ferreira (n 5) 114. 
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III. Form: how to avoid any reference to revolutionary constitutionalism 
As in architecture, on could assume as well in constitutional theory that ‘form follows 
function’. Octroyed constitutions were intended to restore the belief in the 
monarchical principle, but at the same time had to conceal with social reality and 
could not possibly ignore all revolutionary achievements and liberal demands. Their 
function was to restore the authority of a monarch by absorbing parts of the 
revolutionary acquis.51 Or, as Eric Voegelin phrased it: ‘The authoritarian gesture of 
the monarch, appointed by the grace of God to see to the welfare of his subjects, 
captures the revolutionary element of the movement for a constitution and transforms 
it into an act by the monarch’.52 
This function could only be assumed by presenting the octroi as a gift of the 
enlightened monarch and thereby avoiding any reference to the constitutional theory, 
vocabulary and proceedings invented during the preceding revolutionary periods in 
Europe. Formal elements of octroyed constitutions, such as their title, wording, style, 
preambles, and the legal form chosen for enactment, reveal this specific function. 
The compromise consists of making concessions with regard to the substance but 
remaining firm on the form of the octroi. 
This becomes most visible with the denomination chosen for the constitutional 
document. In France the expression ‘charte constitutionnelle’ was deliberately picked 
after having discussed other solutions such as ‘constitutional act’, ‘ordinance’ and 
‘edict’.53 The choice denotes a strong reverence to the Magna Carta of 1215. Already 
the naming of the Charter as ‘constitutional’ was a compromise. The decision to 
name some of the octroyed constitutions in Italy and Spain Statuto (Estatuto) rather 
than Charter proceeded from similar considerations. 
Following the terminology chosen by the German Federal Act of 1815,54 referring in 
its article 13 to the duty of each member state to establish a constitution of estates 
(Landständische Verfassung), several member states employed this expression in 
the title of their constitutions. Notably Würtemberg and Luxemburg did so 
respectively in 1815 and 1841. However, the term Landständische Verfassung has 
                                                
51 cf Lacchè (n 3) 291. 
52 cf Eric Voegelin (n 31) 132. 
53 cf Lauvaux (n 6) 3 quoting the memories of count Beugnot. 
54 The 65 articles were unanimously approved by the Frankfurt Confederal Assembly on June 8, 1820. 
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never been properly defined. In theory, it would have meant a system of corporative 
representation of the estates, impossible to restore within constitutional monarchies 
of that time. It wasn’t even very clear, whether the term refers to a type of constitution 
or rather to a form of representation. In some English versions the term has thus 
been translated as ‘a constitutionally guaranteed assembly of the estates of the land’. 
And although some octroyed documents were simply named ‘constitution’, as in 
Bavaria in 1818, the choice of the name should not be overrated. 
The wording used in the corpus as well as and especially in the preambles of the 
octroyed charters is probably more significant. Most of the charters are undeniably 
preceded by preambles, or followed by a ‘postamble’ as in the case of the Polish 
Charter. The preambles are sometimes rather lengthy with up to 724 words (France 
1814) or even 988 words (Austria 1849). Written in a paternalistic style the 
preambles insist on the monarchic principle and the generosity of the conceding 
monarch. They also contain hints to the expectations of the people and to preceding 
promises of the monarch. 
In analyzing the formal instrument used to proclaim the constitutional octroi, it is 
possible to detect in most of the cases the classical distinction between the 
instrumentum and the negotium. In all examined cases the octroy takes the form of a 
royal act.55 Luxembourg’s constitution of estates of 1841 was published in the form of 
a royal ordinance establishing the constitution.56 The constitution is, however, at the 
same time called a statute (‘loi’) for the purpose of its amendment (art. 52). 
The form taken by the different charters and their denominations does not deprive 
them of the recognition as genuine constitutions. The voices of those who completely 
denied all constitutional nature to octroyed documents remained in the minority 
during the period of their greatest spread.57 The definition of the notion of constitution 
according to the usual functional, formal and material criteria clearly embraces the 
octroyed specimen. 
Of course, we are confronted here with monarchical constitutionalism, and not yet 
representative constitutionalism. The notions and concepts to describe this 
                                                
55 cf Schmitt (n 18) 52: ‘ein vom König erlassenes Gesetz’. 
56 cf the official journal, Mémorial n° 51, 1841, p. 425, orig: ordonnance, Verordnung. 
57 cf Lacchè (n 3) 286 quoting Karl Theodor Welcker, who considered: ‘eine bloss oktroyierte 
Verfassung ist gar keine Verfassung’. 
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movement had to be developed successively. In Portuguese literature the term 
‘Chartism’ (cartismo) was coined to describe the peculiarities of octroyed 
constitutionalism. It can be understood as an effort to develop its own constitutional 
concepts. In a number of respects, Chartism definitely rethought and reworked its 
own liberal vocabulary, redefining basic concepts such as legitimacy, representation, 
nature of government, or extension of suffrage (indirect and census and non-direct 
and extended). 58 
Call it octroyed constitutionalism, 59  restoration constitutionalism, chartism, or 
monarchic constitutionalism, all of these suggestions can be considered an effort to 
ally both constitutionalism ancient and modern. But it has to be born in mind that 
there are strong differences in the meaning of ‘constitutionalism’ in general, with a 
narrow meaning in German compared to a much wider meaning in France, for 
instance.60 
IV. Legitimacy: reconciling conflicting sources 
The concept of Legitimacy can be understood in the divine, meta-legal or sociological 
‘Weberian’ sense. According to German sociologist Max Weber, a political regime 
being legitimate means, in a descriptive sense, that its participants have certain 
beliefs or faith (Legitimitätsglaube) in regard to it: ‘The basis of every system of 
authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief 
by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige’.61 The three types of 
political legitimacy labelled by Weber are: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. 
Constitutional legitimacy, in a normative sense, implies a justification of the 
constitution that must be found beyond the constitution itself. According to Matthias 
Hartwig, the sources of constitutional legitimacy can be found in forms of justification 
                                                
58 cf notably Sardica (n 24) 529. 
59 Though ‘octroyed constitutionalism’ can be taken for an oxymoron, cf Ferreira (n 5) 70. 
60 cf on the notion of ‘monarchischer Konstitutionalismus’ notably Martin Kirsch, Monarch und 
Parlament im 19. Jahrhundert. Der monarchische Konstitutionalismus als europäischer 
Verfassungstyp - Frankreich im Vergleich (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999) 40; Hummel (n 23) 1, who 
both point out these differences. 
61 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (orig. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 
Tübingen 1922, Free Press 1997) 382. 
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as: religion, consent, minimal substantive requirements and standards developed on 
international level.62  
Surprisingly, octroyed constitutions do not draw their legitimacy from religion alone. 
Once enacted, they rather combine two opposing sources of legitimacy: religion and 
consent. The latter is on the rise, the first declining. We will see in the next part of the 
contribution, to what extent they obtain additional legitimacy by fulfilling substantive 
requirements and early international standards. I do not share the conclusion of 
Yasuo Hasebe that ‘how a constitution was made, or in whose name, is not so 
relevant to its legitimacy’.63 This aspect remains important, even though it has to be 
considered in conjunction with the other foundations of its legitimacy. An octroyed 
constitution unavoidably conceals a strong ambiguity resulting from the contradiction 
of two antithetic legitimacy doctrines: the monarchic principle, personified by the 
donor, and the representative principle, embodied by Parliament. 
The divine legitimacy of the donor’s power to concede the constitution was generally 
referred to in the preambles of the different Charters, describing the source of 
legitimacy as ‘the grace of God’ or ‘the divine Providence’. In the sense of this line of 
reasoning, an octroyed constitution was ‘legitimately imposed’. According to the 
monarchical principle, the king, holding the pouvoir constituant, was entitled to give a 
constitution by a unilateral act.64 However, as if the donation of the constitution 
needed additional justifications, some preambles went further and stated reasons like 
the request for peace, promises that had been made and even the ‘expectations of 
enlightened Europe’.65 
Because of their nature of Charte octroyée, granted constitutions were naturally weak 
in regard to their (democratic) legitimisation. But at a subsequent stage, they were 
able to achieve some popular adherence or at least implicit consent through the 
election of representative bodies and the active participation of elected assemblies in 
the implementation of the constitution. In the case of Prussia (1848/1850), one could 
even observe an act of explicit consent. According to the transitional rule of article 
                                                
62 Matthias Hartwig, ‘What Legitimises a National Constitution? On the Importance of International 
Embedding’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Pál Sonnevend (eds), Constitutional Crisis in the European 
Constitutional Area (Nomos 2015) 322. 
63 Hasebe (n 4) para 41. 
64 cf Schmitt (n 18) 52. On the monarchical principle see Friedrich Julius Stahl, Das monarchische 
Prinzip, eine staatsrechtlich-politische Abhandlung (Weltgeist 1845). 
65 Preamble of the French Charte constitutionnelle : ‘l’attente de l’Europe éclairée’. 
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112, a compulsory revision of the document octroyed in 1848 had to take place to let 
the constitution become definitive. 66  In the case of the Statuto Albertino, 
contemporaneous observers immediately attempted to re-interpret the Statuto into a 
convention between king and parliament.67 In such a vision an octroyed constitution 
could come with consent.68  
Another indication for the existence of at least implicit consent is the durability of 
some of the octroyed charters. For memory: The Statuto Albertino remained formally 
in force after the Italian unification until 1946, and the Portuguese Carta of 1826 still 
holds the record of longevity amongst the six Portuguese constitutions adopted since 
1822. We can definitely identify a kind of de facto legitimacy, in the descriptive sense, 
through effectivity and longevity of a constitution. 
V. Substance: ‘absorbing the Revolution into the monarchy’69 
In terms of constitutional substance, octroyed charters have to be evaluated by their 
degree of consistency with the ideals of constitutionalism (limited government, 
representation, separation of powers, protection of human rights, etc.). 
Consequently, this degree is rather low as the spirit of restoration prevails. The ruse 
consisted of capturing some elements of the revolutionary and liberal achievements 
within a monarchical system.  
The octroyed charters therefore re-affirmed the monarchical principle but established 
at the same time what German literature rapidly called the principle of dualism 
(Dualismus).70 Predictably, the monarch retains the executive power and cedes parts 
of the legislative power to an assembly, justice remaining exercised in the name of 
the king. The transfer of competences to a parliament, consisting typically of two 
chambers, entails a self-limitation of the former absolute monarch and contributed to 
establish first practices of parliamentarism. 
                                                
66 cf art. 112: The present Constitution is to be made subject to a revision by (ordinary) legislation 
(Articles 60 and 106) immediately after the first meeting of the chambers. 
67 cf Giuseppe Mecca, ‘The Omnipotence of Parliament in the Legitimisation Process of 
‘Representative Government’ under the Albertine Statute (1848–1861)’ in Müßig (n 20) 183. 
68 cf Richard Albert, ‘Imposed Constitutions with Consent?’ in this volume. 
69 Formula borrowed from Lacchè (n 3) 291. 
70 Regarding the influence of dualism in Luxembourg, see Luc Heuschling, Le citoyen monarque. 
Réflexions sur le Grand-Duc, la famille grand-ducale et le droit de vote (Larcier 2013) 117. 
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The Portuguese Carta innovated insofar as it introduced a fourth power, named 
‘Moderating Power’ (Poder moderador). It attributed inter alia an absolute veto to the 
monarch over legislation emanating from parliament. This moderating power was the 
exclusive competence of the King, as supreme head of the Nation, to watch over its 
independence, as well as for balance and harmony among the other political powers. 
As the holder of this power, the King was called furthermore to convene the Cortes; 
to appoint the Kingdom Peers; to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies; to appoint and 
dismiss the Government; to suspend magistrates and to grant amnesties and 
pardons. 
In addition, some rights are granted to the citizens. The French Charter of 1814 thus 
contains a chapter dedicated to the ‘Public Law of the French’ reaffirming liberal 
fundamental rights as permanent achievements of the Revolution. As the octroyed 
charters always strictly limited the right to vote by strict rules on censitary vote and 
indirect suffrage, they belong to the liberal non democratic type of Constitutions.71 In 
the German monarchies of the 19th century electorate was for instance limited to less 
than 1 % of the population for the election of the lower house. 
Compared to the previous situation, however, they still do appear in a number of 
cases as improvements. The constitution of Prussia 1848/1850 guaranteed for 
instance the ‘Rights of the Prussians’ as citizens’ rights comprising equality, personal 
freedom, inviolability of residence, freedom of opinion and of the press and freedom 
of assembly. 
Some observers underline the ‘incompleteness’ of octroyed constitutions as one of 
their specific features. 72  The French Charter of 1814 obviously lacks a rule of 
devolution of the crown and a procedure of amendment. This must be understood as 
an inevitable consequence of the fact that the king’s sovereignty remains exterior to 
the granted constitution. Regarding the absence of rules of devolution of the crown, 
the same is true for the Constitution of Luxembourg from 1841 and even for the 
current constitution dating back to 1868. 
                                                
71 cf Dieter Grimm, ‘Types of constitutions’, in Michel Rosenfeld, András Sajó (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 119. 
72 cf with regard to the French Charter : Stefan Rials, ‘Essai sur le concept de monarchie limitée 
(autour de la Charte de 1814)’ in Stefan Rials (ed), Revolution et Contre-Révolution au XIXè siècle 
(Albatros 1987) 96. 
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As a natural effect of the mentioned incompleteness, octroyed constitutions left a 
broad margin for interpretation. Their exact meaning was often disputed because of 
ambiguous formulations, leaving place for both a royalist and a liberal lecture. 
Flexibility was thus a common feature of the granted charters. As judicial review was 
regarded incompatible with the monarchical principle, there was no ‘authentic 
interpreter’ but the king himself. 
VI. Revision: who is entitled to amend the octroi? 
The question of amendment of octroyed constitutions leads to interesting but 
divergent outcomes regarding existence, nature and practice of an amendment 
power. As a consequence of the inherent ambiguity of octroyed constitutions, many 
discussions took place regarding the question of the constitution’s binding character 
on the conceding monarch. Within the German constitutional monarchies, the 
prevailing position was that the constitution, once granted by the king, could no 
longer be modified or withdrawn unilaterally. A revision had to be decided jointly by 
the Monarch and the people’s representatives, as with ordinary laws. When, for 
example, the King of Hanover unilaterally abolished the constitution in 1837, this was 
regarded as a breach of the law, and was proclaimed as such on September 18, 
1837 by seven professors of the University of Göttingen.73  For the first time in 
German history, they postulated the continued validity of the constitution (one of the 
constitutions of estates under the Federal Act) by risking their own existence.74  
Their position was consistent with articles 54 and 56 of the Vienna Final Act. Article 
54 reaffirmed the duty of the States to establish a constitution. The Confederal 
Assembly had to monitor that this regulation did not remain unfulfilled in any 
Confederal state. In theory, subjects were able to file a complaint if this did not 
happen. In practice, this meant little as long as the leading states of Austria and 
Prussia refrained to adopt constitutions. According to Article 56, ‘the constitutions of 
estates standing in recognized validity can only be changed by constitutional means.’ 
Therefore, monarchs could not lawfully change or abolish the constitution, not even 
in a coup d’état. The terms ‘recognized validity’ referred to the fact that a constitution 
was actually applied. The expression was meant to exclude attempts to restore 
                                                
73 cf Wilhelm Bleek, Bernhard Lauer, ‘Protestation des Gewissens. Die Rechtfertigungsschriften der 
Göttinger Sieben’ (2012) 36 Schriften der Brüder Grimm-Gesellschaft. 
74 In fact all of them were dismissed and three even banished from the country. 
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ancient constitutional law, theoretically valid, which had not been applied since 
absolutism.  
The donor’s de facto power to revoke the Constitution unilaterally did not disappear 
completely. The Austrian Empire created the precedent. First the Pillersdorffsche 
Verfassung was repealed in July 1848 and later replaced by the octroyed 
Constitution of March 1849. But the latter was once more retracted by the imperial 
patent of 31 December 1851, the so-called Silvesterpatent.75 So, a process of neo-
absolutist reorganization of the state, announced since the defeat of the Vienna 
uprising in October 1848, took place in the Austrian Empire. 
During the Restoration period it wasn’t evident at all how to establish a ‘pouvoir 
constituant dérivé’ distinct from the monarch’s ‘pouvoir constituant originaire’. In 
some cases, the question was therefore simply left open. The French Charter of 
1814 gave the example. In absence of an explicit amendment procedure, it was in 
fact amended either following the ordinary legislative procedure or, in case of 
necessity acknowledged by the king, by royal ordinances. 76  The only tangible 
obstacle to amendments was the promise made by Louis XVIII at the end of the 
preamble octroying the Charter ‘both for him and his successors and forever’.77 But 
this promise could easily be modified by agreement between the King, holding the 
monopoly of legislative initiative, and the two houses of Parliament. Some important 
amendments were adopted by the houses upon royal proposal in the form of ordinary 
legislation.78 The Italian Statuto albertino, as well, did not provide for an amendment 
procedure. However, in practice, it was later amended by ordinary laws and 
consequently qualified as flexible constitution. 
Within the member states of the German Confederation the situation was different. 
Most of their constitutions contained precise rules on amendment. In Luxembourg 
article 52 of the 1841 constitution of estates, required, for instance, the election of a 
Chamber with twice the number of members, a procedure respected in 1848 but 
violated by the coup d’état of 1856. The German constitutions, established by octroi 
                                                
75 Published in the imperial official journal, RGBl. no 3, 1852 27. 
76 cf Lauvaux (n 6) 5 who quotes two ordinances of July 13, 1815 and August 19, 1815. 
77 Orig: ‘tant pour lui que pour ses successeurs et à toujours’. 
78 cf Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (3rd edn, Häring 1914), 527, mentioning the legislative act 
of June 9, 1824, modifying the rules on the renewal of the house of deputies from partial to integral 
renewal; Adhémar Esmein, Eléments de droit constitutionnel français et compare (6th edn, repr. 
Editions Panthéon-Assas 2008) 575. 
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in the period of the early constitutionalism, also recognized the necessity of special 
rules for amendment. A two thirds majority in both chambers was commonly required 
to revise the constitutional act. Yet, in spite of the shared exercise of the amendment 
power, the monarch retained the right to sanction all legislative acts and held a veto 
right.79 The constitution of Prussia of 1848/1850 established a flexible procedure. 
Amendments were to be adopted by the king and both chambers through the 
procedure applicable for ordinary legislation (art. 60 and 106). 
Portugal’s Carta of 1826 knew the most detailed procedure as described in its 
articles 140 – 143. Any proposal of revision had to be supported by a third of the 
members of the chamber of deputies and the first amendment being allowed only 
after the end of an initial four-year period. A proposal had to go through three 
readings in the Chamber and to be submitted for final approval to the Chamber in the 
following legislature. This procedure was only required for ‘constitutional provisions’, 
defined by article 144 as ‘those who concern the limits and respective powers of the 
Political Powers, and the individual and political rights of the Citizens’. Everything ‘not 
constitutional’ in this sense could be amended according to the formalities applying 
for ordinary legislation. Four additional acts were published in 1852, 1885, 1895-1896 
and 1907 but only the second one strictly observed the detailed rules on 
amendment.80  
In absence of specific rules on amendment the development of some octroyed 
constitutions materialized naturally through informal constitutional change. This was, 
for instance, the case of the Statuto albertino that remained in force for almost a 
century. According to its wording, the government was responsible to the king only. 
Originally, it was understood as a rather conservative document that set up a strong 
constitutional monarchy. But its spirit was subsequently altered, at first in a liberal 
way, to adapt it to the parliamentary government of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, and then in an authoritarian direction under Benito Mussolini’s Fascist 
regime (1922–1943). 
 
                                                
79 cf Hummel (n 23) 7 quoting the amendment procedures in Bavaria and Baden. 
80 cf Miranda (n 10) 50; Paulo Jorge Fernandes, ‘Os Actos Adicionais à Carta Constitucional de 1826’ 
(2012) 13 Historia Constitucional 563. 
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Having examined process, form, legitimacy, substance and amendment of octroyed 
constitutions in 19th century Europe, a clearer picture emerges as to what they really 
were. To answer the question raised in the title of this contribution: No, octroyed 
constitutions should not be considered as imposed constitutions. They form a 
category of their own. Moreover, it should be avoided to equate imposed 
constitutions with octroyed constitutions or to use the term octroi in a general manner 
to describe imposed constitutions.  
Our Japanese colleague, Yasuo Hasebe, said that ‘whether a constitution is imposed 
is a question of degree, not a question of kind’. 81  In my opinion, an octroyed 
constitution is a kind of its own. It is decreed by a monarch claiming to hold the 
‘pouvoir constituant’ through divine providence. It is in most cases domestically 
enacted and it is also self-imposed by a, more or less, enlightened monarch who 
sacrifices, more or less, voluntarily parts of his absolute power to share their exercise 
with a parliamentary body. As these charters commonly confirmed some of the liberal 
achievements of post-revolutionary constitutionalism they encountered tacit approval 
or passive tolerance of the peoples considering the substantive achievements 
resulting from the monarch's ‘gift’. 
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